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 ABSTRACT 
 
An increase in outward orientation in general, and in export-oriented manufacturing in 
particular is widely indicated as a suitable developmental path for SSA. The logic for 
this is drawn both from the demonstration effect of China and the earlier generation of 
Asian NICs, and from theory. However, the entry of China (and to a lesser extent India) 
into the global economy as a significant exporter of manufactures, poses severe 
problems for export-oriented growth in SSA. This can be seen from SSA’s recent 
experience in the clothing and textile sectors, often considered to be the first step in 
export-oriented manufacturing growth. Without sustained trade preferences over Asian 
producers, SSA’s clothing and textile industry will be largely excluded from global 
markets and face significant threats in its domestic market. This has generalisable 
implications for other sectors, and for other sets of low income producers. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The development agenda continues to be dominated by the belief that the key to long-
term growth lies in increasing integration into the global economy. The World Bank’s 
influential assessment in 2002 of the link between poverty and deepening globalization 
forcefully promoted the case for further globalisation, notably through rapid growth in 
developing country exports of manufactures (World Bank, 2002: xi). Heavily influenced 
by this multilateral- and bilateral-agency policy agenda, and drawing on the successful 
growth and manufactured export experience of the first generation of Asian NICs, SSA 
economies have increasingly oriented their long-term growth objectives around a 
graduation from the export of primary products to the export of manufactures. The 
demonstration effect of the astonishing emergence of China as a major global exporter 
of manufactures and its relatively successful performance in meeting the $1/day 
Millennium Development Goal has provided further impetus to this policy consensus. 
 
Two major sets of factors influence the effectiveness in SSA of this policy agenda of 
outward oriented growth based on an expansion of manufactured exports. The first 
comprises a cluster of endogenous factors which affect SSA’s supply response to 
global market opportunities. These include the quality of infrastructure, the 
effectiveness of property rights, peace and security, technological capabilities, and 
effective entrepreneurship. In all these respects, with the possible exception of South 
Africa, almost all SSA economies face formidable challenges. The second set of 
factors are those which are exogenous to SSA, reflecting changing dynamics in the 
global economy. The successful experience of Asia suggests that the last few decades 
have been a particularly opportune historical moment for emerging economies to 
pursue outward oriented strategies, especially in regard to the export of manufactures. 
This being the case, the policy challenge for SSA may be summarised as comprising 
the need to develop weak domestic capabilities and align these with favourable 
external market opportunities. 
 
Mainstream economics provides a theoretical framework to justify outward orientation, 
particularly with regard to manufactured exports. Productivity growth arises in large 
part from the division of labour (Smith, 1776) and this is aided by access to large 
global markets, particularly in the context of technology-induced scale economies 
(Moores and Verdoorns’ Laws, McCombie, 1986). Access to new and demanding 
external markets provides the incentive for innovation and technological change 
(Clerides, Lach and Tybout, 1998; Greenaway and Kneller, 2007). Notwithstanding 
frictional adjustments, a dynamic global economy provides the scope for all 
participants, irrespective of absolute advantage, as long as they specialise in areas of 
comparative advantage (Ricardo, 1817). It is in these circumstances that we can 
observe the win-win alignment between endogenous and exogenous factors which 
drives the commitment to outward oriented industrial growth in much of SSA. 
 
In this paper we challenge the relevance of this manufactured-export oriented growth 
agenda for SSA. In summary, we argue that the intellectual rationale for the gains from 
trade hinge around the validity of Ricardo’s invocation to specialise in areas of 
comparative advantage. We argue that Ricardo’s framework depends crucially on his 
related assumptions of full employment and immobility of capital. In a world of 
structural excess capacity and capital mobility, it no longer follows that all countries will 
necessarily benefit from trade-openness (Kaplinsky, 2005). The global advance of the 
two Asian Driver economies of China and India – individually much larger than the 
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Asian forerunners of Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong, and 
collectively of even more formidable size – challenges both the small country 
assumption of trade theory and the assumption of full employment amongst global 
trading partners (Kaplinsky and Messner, Introduction to this Special Issue). Given the 
absolute advantage of the Asian Driver (hereafter AD) economies in many sectors of 
relevance to potential SSA exporters, and given the mobility of global producers and 
buyers searching for least-cost supply, there is constrained space for some other (but 
of course not all other) participants in the contemporary global economy. SSA 
manufactured exports – existing and potential - are particularly adversely affected by 
the AD advance   
 
We evidence this view with an analysis of SSA’s performance in the global garments 
and textile industries in Section 3, and consider the implications of these findings to 
other sectors and economies in Section 4. But, before undertaking this analysis, we 
briefly review SSA’s recent trading experience in manufactures, both in relation to 
trade with the two major Asian Driver economies (China and India) and in sectors in 
which China and India participate effectively in the global economy (Section 2). 
 
 
2. SSA MANUFACTURED EXPORTS AND THE ASIAN DRIVERS 
 
(a) Overall growth and trade performance 
 
There was a moderate revival in SSA’s GDP, industrial and manufacturing growth 
rates in the early years of the millennium (Table 1). Distinguishing between the first 
and second half of the period between 1990 (when Structural Adjustment induced 
liberalisation began to be implemented widely throughout SSA) and 2005, the rate of 
growth of GDP and industrial value added quickened in the latter period. However, 
much of this industrial growth can be attributed to a replenishing of infrastructure and 
the processing of hard commodities since the growth of manufacturing value added 
(MVA) was lower than that of industrial value added, service sector value added and 
agricultural value added. A second notable conclusion to be drawn from Table 1 is the 
relatively poor performance of SSA in comparison to that of China and India. With the 
exception of SSA’s agricultural growth relative to that of India, SSA’s performance 
lagged significantly behind that of both China and India across the sectors. SSA 
performed better than the world average in the more recent period in all respects bar 
growth in MVA. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The share of manufacturing in SSA GDP was stable over the period between 1995 and 
2005 (Table 2). This ratio is lower in absolute terms than in other developing countries 
in general and China in particular. Not surprisingly, SSA’s share of global MVA 
remained minimal at less than one per cent over the 1990-2005 period. In contrast, 
that of China rose from 2.2 to eight per cent (and even more so, if calculated at PPP 
rates) in the same period. (UNIDO International Year Book 2006). 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Changes in the policy regime in SSA favouring greater openness during the 1990s led 
to a notable increase in the trade/GDP ratio which grew from 52 per cent in 1990 to 68 
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per cent in 2005. This compares with similar figures of 29 to 75 per cent and 14 to 40 
per cent for China and India respectively (the end-date for India is 2004). Much of this 
growing trade openness was due to an expansion in merchandise trade; in 2005, 
SSA’s merchandise trade/GDP ratio stood at 58 percent, an increase from 41 per cent 
in 1990. Focusing on the export side of this trade/GDP structure, the rate of growth of 
SSA’s merchandise exports in the most recent period (1998-2004) exceeded that of 
the global average (but not China or India (Table 3). 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
This impressive performance with regard to merchandise exports was largely due to 
the growth of SSA’s oil and gas exports. The share of oil and gas in SSA’s total 
exports grew from 31 to 47 percent between 1995 and 2005, whilst the share of 
manufacturing remained largely stable (Table 4). Oil and gas make the big difference 
to SSA’s overall trade balance. With these commodities, the region had a rapidly 
growing trade surplus (rising from $4.6bn in 1995 to $46.6bn in 2005; excluding oil and 
gas, SSA’s trade deficit grew from $13bn to $20.9bn in the same period. 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
(b) Structure of SSA’s manufacturing trade 
 
In considering the structure of SSA’s manufacturing exports we utilise the Lall-criteria 
of technological intensity grouping products into five categories – primary commodities, 
resource-based products, low-technology products, medium-technology products and 
high-technology products (Lall, 2000). Employing this taxonomy, Table 5 reflects the 
pattern of SSA’s trade with the world, and compares this with India’s and China’s trade 
structure. In China’s case there was a significant shift up the technological profile over 
the decade, with the share of high-tech products in total exports reaching 33 per cent 
in the latter period. India saw a similar shift in profile, albeit at a slower rate of change 
and into the medium, rather than the high-tech reaches. By contrast, there was no shift 
in SSA into medium and high technology exports (overwhelmingly manufactures in the 
Lall classification), but rather a shift from resource-based processing industries into 
primary products (which are technology-intensive but with far fewer spillovers than in 
the case of manufactures). 1 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
Excluding South Africa, which is a special case deserving of attention on its own, the 
sectoral composition of SSA’s manufactured exports shows a heavy concentration on 
clothing and textiles. Table 6 sets out the data, beginning with “broad manufactures”, 
that is SITC Sectors 5, 6, 7, and 8 (minus SITC 68 non-ferrous metals). These more 
than doubled between 1990 and 2005, from $5.7bn to $12.5bn. However, this 
impressive headline growth needs to be adjusted in some key respects. First, the 
largest component in 2005 was SITC 6672, unset diamonds, accounting for exports of 
$5.5bn. Second, There were significant “exports” of “railway/tramway” equipment 
(SITC 79) from Liberia ($1.3bn in 2005, virtually entirely ships) and Senegal (£100m in 
2005, virtually entirely aircraft). However, a closer look at the data shows that both 
these economies were in trade deficit in both trade classifications. Their “exports” thus 
represent re-exports to the region. Third, included in this “broad manufactures” 
category” are also methanol exports from Equatorial Guinea (SITC 51211), which is 
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effectively a petroleum export, and uranium (SITC 52511) from Namibia and Niger. If 
we net out these items from the “broad manufactures category” we obtain a narrower 
classification of “narrow manufactures”. 
 
Table 6 shows that clothing and textiles accounted for a combined total of 53 per cent 
of all “narrow manufactures” exports from SSA excluding South Africa in 2005, and 
that this had risen from 42 per cent in 1990. Within that, the share of low-tech and 
labour-intensive clothing rose from 33 to 50 per cent, and that of higher-tech and 
capital-intensive textiles fell from 9 to 2.6 per cent, reflecting the 3rd country fabric 
provision of AGOA (African Growth and Opportunities Act). The next most significant 
“narrow manufactures” exports was corkwood manufactures (almost entirely veneer 
sheets, SITC 63412 and SITC 63451), followed by iron and steel products (5.6 per 
cent, SITC 67) and leather manufactures (6.9 per cent, SITC 61). 
 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
A final observation on the structure of non-South African manufactured exports 
concerns the low levels of value added in these expanded exports of clothing and 
textiles. Much of this occurs through the processing of imported fabrics and 
accessories (see below), mostly imported from China (and to a lesser extent from 
India) (Figure 1). Thus, although clothing exports increased significantly from $1.3bn to 
$2.5bn over the decade from 1995, there was a larger proportionate increase in 
imports of textile and other clothing inputs from the ADs.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
 
 
(c) SSA trade with the Asian Drivers 
 
Trade with the ADs comprised a small proportion of SSA’s total trade in the early years 
of the millennium (Table 7). Despite very rapid growth, by 2005 SSA exports to China 
and India were only 15.5 and 3.3 per cent of trade with the developed economies. The 
ratios for imports were somewhat higher, albeit still less than 20 per cent of total 
imports from the developed economies. However, trade with the ADs has grown very 
rapidly, and at current and projected growth rates, this picture is likely to change very 
rapidly in the future. As Table 8 shows, although SSA trade with China is balanced in 
SSA’s favour, this is entirely due to SSA’s growing oil and gas exports. Without these, 
the trade balance has been both negative and growing. By contrast, SSA has a deficit 
in its trade with India, and at least until 2005, this included a deficit with regard to 
petroleum products. The likelihood, however, is that SSA oil and gas exports to India 
will increase and a number of Indian oil and gas companies have been bidding to 
exploit reserves in SSA.2 
 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
 
The structure of SSA’s trade with the ADs is somewhat different to that of trade with 
the rest of the world (Table 9). On the export side, trade with China is 
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disproportionately geared to primary commodities (oil, gas) and to India in resource-
based products. In general, SSA’s exports to China’s are more similar to those of 
SSA’s global exports than are its exports to India, to whom it disproportionately directs 
resource based products. It is significant that intraregional exports are more 
technology intensive than those destined for non-SSA markets, and that the degree of 
technological intensity has been growing. On the import side, SSA sources medium 
and high technology products from China, and low and medium technology products 
from India. It is notable that SSA’s exports are much more heavily concentrated than 
its imports. Taking China as an example, oil and gas alone account for 69.3 percent of 
the total, and the largest 10 product categories (HS 4-digit) for 81 per cent of all 
exports. By contrast, on the import side, the 25 largest products only account for just 
over one-third of all of SSA’s imports from China.   
 
INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
3. MFA, QUOTA REMOVAL AND SSA’S CLOTHING AND TEXTILES SECTOR 
 
In Section 2 we noted SSA’s dismal performance with regard to manufactured exports. 
Outside of South Africa, these exports were significantly centred on clothing and 
textiles. Since the clothing and textile sector has historically been an important entry 
point for industrialisation in low income economies, the impact of the ADs on SSA’s 
advance in this sector holds important lessons for the wider impact of the ADs on 
SSA’s industrial progress. Focusing on the trade vector, this impact may either be 
direct and indirect, but since the focus on this paper lies on the impact of the ADs on 
SSA’s manufactured exports, it is to the indirect effect that our attention is directed.3 
 
Three sets of factors have determined SSA’s performance in the global market for 
clothing and textiles – the structure of the global industry itself (and particularly the 
importance of global buyers searching for scale and low-cost suppliers); the global 
regulation of trade; and SSA’s relative competitiveness). 
 
(a) Structure of the global industry and the role of global buyers 
 
China is substantially the world’s largest clothing exporter, increasing the value of its 
clothing exports by 667 percent from $9.7 billion in 1990 to $74.2 billion in 2005. In 
1990, China accounted for only nine percent of the world’s total clothing exports, but 
by 2005, its share had increased to 27 percent, and if Hong Kong with 10 percent of 
the world total is included, China effectively accounted for more than one third of world 
clothing exports. China is also the world’s largest exporter of textiles products. Its 
textiles exports increased from $7.2 billion in 1990 to $41.1 billion in 2005 (469 
percent), while its share of the world total more than doubled (from 7% in 1990 to 20% 
in 2005). Adding-in Hong Kong gives China a share of 27 per cent of global textile 
exports. (Morris et al 2007, updated to include 2005 data).  
 
SSA is only a small participant on this global stage. Its share of global textile exports 
was only 2.6 percent in 2004, and 3.7 percent for clothing (WTO, 2005) Most of these 
clothing and textile exports are destined for the USA and here in order of importance, 
the largest SSA clothing and textile exporters are Lesotho, Madagascar, Kenya, 
Mauritius, Swaziland and South Africa (see below). 
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A key factor determining the structure of the global clothing and textiles sector is the 
concentration of global buying power in the industrialised countries (Gereffi and 
Memedovic 2003; Kaplinsky, 2005). The significance of this buyer concentration is the 
requirement of these buyers for large volumes (and of course low prices). This has 
made it difficult for small scale suppliers to meet the requirements of large global 
buyers, and this has advantaged countries such as China with large volume plants, 
and transnational companies (often based in Hong Kong and Taiwan) who have a 
competitive advantage in organising large scale production runs. 
 
Global sourcing and production concentration has increasingly developed into a 
complex “triangular” division of labour in which the large oligopsonistic buyers and 
retailers in the major consuming markets determine their needs in close discussion 
with global sourcing firms (Gereffi, 1999). These global intermediaries then organise 
the production to meet these needs, predominantly by drawing on independent global 
and/or local producers. Increasingly the intermediary system-integrators – 
predominantly based in East Asia – determine the geography of production (albeit not 
the geography of consumption) - in the global clothing and textiles sector (Gereffi, 
1999; Gibbon, 2003; Gereffi and Memedovic 2003; Kaplinsky, 2005). 
 
Given the constraints of the global trading structure (see below) sourcing decisions 
reflect costs and efficiency. Although the clothing industry has become increasingly 
characterised by the requirement for shorter lead-times, greater inter- and intra 
seasonal variety and tighter logistics (Gereffi and Memedovic 2003; Kaplinsky, 2005; 
USITC, 2004), cost has been king in this industry. The intensity of competition in these 
areas has been reflected in cost pressures, and as Figure 2 shows, since the mid-
1990s there has been a secular downtrend in the global price of clothing (as reflected 
in the unit price of clothing imports into the USA). These data are in current prices, so 
the fall in real prices was even greater over this period. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
  
 
 
(b) The regulation of global trade in clothing and textiles 
 
(i) The evolving trade regime 
The most important determinant of global production structure has been the protective 
regime, since this has determined the pool of countries who can reliably serve these 
large scale global buyers with low cost and quality-assured product. Without going into 
too much detail, three protective regimes have been important, particularly in 
explaining SSA’s role in this global industry. It is important to note here that it is the US 
protective regime which is most important to the SSA clothing and textiles industry, 
since the overwhelming share of exports are destined to the US market, particularly for 
Kenya, Lesotho and Swaziland (Table 10 below) 
 
Historically, the most important preferential trade regime has been the Multifibre 
Arrangement (MFA) (formally superseded by the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing 
in 1994, but still largely referred to as the MFA). This largely quota-based preferential 
trade agreement led to production spreading to an ever-increasing number of 
countries. This was largely because firms in quota-full economies organised garment 
production in under-utilised quota producer countries (Gereffi, 1999). An increasing 
7 
 
number of garment firms from Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan, India and Sri Lanka 
established plants in SSA to take advantage of MFA quotas, initially in Mauritius, and 
then in South Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland, Madagascar and Kenya. Towards the end of 
the 1990s, Mauritian producers who had exceeded their quota sales into the EU 
(particularly) and the US, relocated some of their production to Madagascar to take 
advantage of its unutilised quotas. The MFA came to an end on December 31 2004, 
and with it, the termination of all quotas on textiles and clothing trade between member 
states of the WTO. However, the removal of quotas did not mean a “level playing field” 
since global trade in clothing and textiles is still regulated by tariffs. In the case of the 
US, in 2005, the weighted average tariff (for world) for textiles was 6.93 per cent, while 
that for apparel was 11.36 per cent (TRAINS data based accessed through 
http://wits.worldbank.org on 24th January 2007) 
 
AGOA was introduced in May 2000 and aimed to facilitate SSA export-led growth by 
extending GSP tariff preferences to a wider range of products (subject to minimum 
levels of value added). The largest manufacturing sector beneficiary of AGOA has 
been the clothing and textiles sector, since clothing and textiles has been excluded 
from the GSP scheme. AGOA incorporated different rules of origin to the GSP. It built 
on procedures which had been established early in the 1990s in relation to the 
Caribbean Basin Initiative allowing for the use of US-origin inputs or regional inputs in 
the calculation of minimum levels of value added (35 percent). 
  
Nevertheless, despite these concessions, other than South Africa and Mauritius, few 
SSA economies were able to meet these rules of origin in the clothing and textiles 
sector. Thus, in a further key amendment, AGOA-qualifying countries which were 
classified as being in the “least developed” category were subject to a further 
amendment to GSP rules of origin. That is, until September 2007 (subsequently 
amended with modifications to September 2010 – see below) they could source their 
material and accessory inputs from non-AGOA and non-US bases suppliers (up to a 
restricted share of US clothing imports), including from China and other Asian 
economies. In other words, they were freed from the minimum value added 
requirement.  
 
(ii) AGOA and SSA clothing and textile exports 
AGOA has had a critical impact on SSA’s global (including intra-regional) clothing and 
textile exports. Three major trends can be discerned (Table 10). First, it led to a rapid 
expansion of trade. In three low income economies – Kenya, Lesotho and Swaziland – 
between 1999 and 2004, clothing exports grew from virtually nothing to $495m for 
Lesotho, $333m for Kenya and $205m for Swaziland. For Lesotho and Swaziland, this 
comprised the overwhelming bulk of merchandise exports. In two other economies – 
South Africa and Mauritius – clothing and textile exports grew rapidly until 2003 (to 
$1bn and $1.6bn respectively), but as the rules of origin derogation did not apply to 
them, and (in the case of South Africa) the exchange rate rapidly appreciated, exports 
began to fell sharply after 2003. In the case of Madagascar, exports to the US largely 
followed the pattern of the industry’s principals, many of whom had relocated to 
Madagascar from Mauritius. Second, the share of exports going to the US was 
similarly dominating for Kenya, Lesotho and Swaziland, but less so for Madagascar, 
South Africa and Mauritius4. And, third, virtually all exports to the US were under the 
AGOA preferential scheme. 
 
 INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE 
8 
 
 
 
(iii) Impact of quota removal on SSA clothing and textile exports to the US 
In assessing the outcome of the two years of quota removal on these six SSA clothing 
and textile exporters, we concentrate on the clothing sector since with the exception of 
South Africa, there are negligible direct exports of textiles to the US. In each case we 
compare export volumes and market shares for all exports. However, since a key to 
market developments lies in unit price behaviour, we also analyse unit prices at the 
highest level of trade disaggregation (10-digit HS product categories).  
 
As can be seen from Table 11 and Figure 3, the major trends were that: 
 
• The value of SSA clothing exports to the US dropped by 26 per cent between 
2004 and 2006. This masked differential country performance. Lesotho 
experienced a fall in export value of 15 per cent, most of which occurred in 
2005; its exports stabilised in 2006. Madagascar, fared worse (a decline of 26 
per cent), as did Swaziland (24 per cent). Kenya saw largely unchanged exports 
(a fall of only five per cent). The biggest casualties were South Africa (a decline 
of 53 per cent) and Mauritius (a decline of 48 per cent). Significantly neither of 
these latter two economies were able to utilise the 3rd country fabric derogation.  
 
• By contrast, in the same period, the value of China’s clothing and textile exports 
to the US increased by 84 per cent. In the major products exported to the US by 
AGOA, the value of Chinese exports rose by 161 per cent. 
  
• Unit prices on average remained reasonably stable in key product groupings for 
individual SSA countries in 2005, with Madagascar experiencing the sharpest 
decline (10 per cent).5 In contrast, in the same product groupings, the unit value 
of Chinese exports almost halved. (However, it is not clear to what extent this 
was due to a reduction in the unit prices of individual products, or China’s entry 
into producing lower-end products within each of these 10-digit product 
classifications). 
 
• In general AGOA economies performed less badly in their major exported items 
than they did in aggregate, suggesting a process of specialisation. However, 
alarmingly, in general China’s export growth and the rate of price decline in 
these AGOA-populated sectors were greater than for its overall textile and 
clothing exports, suggesting potentially heightened competition for SSA 
products in the future.  
 
• There has been significant churn as exporting firms in SSA have struggled with 
competition. For example, eight of the 10 largest product items (10-digit 
classification) exported from AGOA between January-November 2006 were not 
exported to the US in the same period in 2005, and only seven of the 10 major 
exported items in 2005 were exported in 2006. 
 
• The share of SSA exporters in the US clothing and textiles imports grew 
between 2001 and 2004, reflecting the combination of quota-access and 
preferential AGOA trading arrangements. However, the removal of MFA quotas 
set back this advance, and African exporters experienced a significant fall in 
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their share of the US market after quota removal (Figure 3). By contrast, the 
share of China in each of these major product markets grew significantly. 
 
INSERT TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE 
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
A major consequence of this decline in exports from the AGOA region was the impact 
on employment and overall economic activity. At its peak, in 2002, Lesotho’s clothing 
exports to the US accounted for virtually all manufactured exports, and were equivalent 
to 50 percent of GDP. In Kenya in 2003, clothing enterprises accounted for the 
equivalent of nearly 20 percent of all formal sector manufacturing employment. Table 
12 shows the impact of quota removal on employment in 2005. In Swaziland, most 
severely affected, overall employment almost halved. In Lesotho, in the first half of 
2005, eight of the 47 garment exporting factories closed and employment fell by 26 per 
cent. Even in Kenya (where clothing exports had only fallen by 2.5 percent in 2005), 
employment declined by nearly ten percent. The impact on South African is more 
severe than appears from Table 12, since there had been employment loss in the 
industry in the years preceding quota removal, although the exact figures are difficult to 
determine (Edwards and Morris 2007). This was a result of competition in third country 
markets (South Africa had never been able to benefit from the 3rd country fabric 
provision), an appreciation of the Rand, and the direct impact of Chinese competition 
in the domestic market.  
 
INSERT TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
However, after this initial decline following the removal of MFA quotas in 2005, the 
position in Lesotho and Kenya stabilised in 2006. In Lesotho’s case, employment rose 
from the trough of 40,000 in mid-2005 to 45,000 in late 2006, still below the 2004 peak 
of 54,000 in 2004, and the decline in export value was halted. In Kenya, the fall in 
export values remained low. Interviews with manufactures and buyers in both countries 
and the US suggest three factors which explain this stabilising performance. First, in 
the case of Lesotho, its DCCS scheme6 provided subsidies to local producers. Second, 
the US buyers sourcing from Lesotho were mindful of the possibility of China 
Safeguards being sustained.7 Third, in both countries buyers and producers had the 
expectation that the 3rd country sourcing provision (which had been due to expire in 
September 2005), would be maintained (as we shall see below, this was broadly 
correct).  
 
Why did the other AGOA exporters not experience a similar stabilisation in 2006? 
Neither South Africa nor Mauritius were able to benefit from the 3rd country fabric 
provision. Moreover, South African producers experienced a rising exchange rate and 
suffered more than most from a breakdown in extending the DCCS. In the case of 
Swaziland, some of the loss of exports to the US were compensated for by finding new 
markets in South Africa. The stabilization of exports in 2006 is not reflected in the data 
because it is intra SACU trade and appears as an increase in clothes for the domestic 
market. Moreover, Swaziland did not benefit from an efficient policy infrastructure 
which has distinguished Lesotho’s response to the crisis. Finally, in the case of 
Madagascar, two factors led to a diversion of exports away from the USA and into 
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other markets. Firstly many of the principals in the clothing sector were of Mauritian or 
European origin, and they had made the strategic decision to focus on the EU market 
(witness the relatively low share of the US in Madagascar’s exports in Table 10 
above).8 Secondly, in 2005 the Madagascan producers began to supply the rapidly 
expanding South African market. 
 
(c) SSA’s competitive gap 
 
In assessing the nature and determinants of SSA’s lack of competitiveness in US 
markets, we polled the views of 20 U.S. buyers in the summer of 2005 (see Kaplinsky 
and Morris, 2006 for more detail). These companies are large, multi-store operations 
with substantive global sourcing activities in clothing and other consumer goods. The 
participants came from four key market segments: branded specialty retail (nine 
responses), manufacturers (branded and private label, eight responses), department 
stores (two responses), and mass merchants (one response). The share of their total 
sourcing portfolio which comes from SSA ranges from one to five percent with the 
exception of one small company (turnover of $30m in 2004) which obtained 30 percent 
of its product from SSA.  
 
AGOA preferences were very important in the decision to source from SSA, with more 
than half of the buyers (10 out of 19) reporting that it was “very important” (Figure 4). 
However, even more important was the view that it was the derogation on the rules of 
origin allowing AGOA economies to source fabrics from Asia which made it possible 
for these economies to compete (15 of the 19 buyers characterised this as being “very 
important”). Few of the buyers in this survey thought that existing or likely future “China 
safeguards” would be the marginal or decisive factor, although as we have seen in the 
case of Lesotho, this was an important consideration for some buyers. A majority of 
buyers also thought that consumer pressures on Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) were a significant factor in sourcing from SSA, reflecting the growing 
commercial need of buyers to show awareness of the poverty-impact of their sourcing 
decisions. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
We also asked the US buyers to rank the performance of firms in SSA when compared 
to Chinese and Indian counterparts (Figure 5). Chinese firm capabilities were clearly 
seen to be more developed, in every respect, followed by Indian suppliers and then, 
some way behind, by SSA suppliers. The performance gap was smallest for labour 
relations, and greatest for delivery time and flexibility, product development 
capabilities, technology levels and quality. With the exception of delivery time, these 
are all areas where SSA firms can improve and this is an issue which we address 
below. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
Although, historically, quotas were important in the establishment of the export-
oriented clothing and textiles sector in SSA, the key to understanding the future 
prospects of SSA AGOA exporters lies in the realm of costs. Within this, the degree of 
competitive advantage held by AGOA exporters arises from their duty preferences. 
And, here, US nominal tariffs significantly underestimate the degree of preference 
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which AGOA producers are actually accorded. This can be seen by taking the example 
of two different products exported by Swaziland producers (Table 13). The first product 
is cotton denim jeans, where nominal duty preference was 16.6 percent in 2005, and 
the second is synthetic women’s underwear, where the nominal duty preference is 
higher, at 28.2 percent.  
 
In effect, these tariffs are a form of cost-subsidy to exporting firms. However, the rates 
of effective subsidy on these products are in fact much higher than these nominal 
rates, due to the derogation which Swaziland (and all other AGOA producers bar 
Mauritius and South Africa) producers have in using imported fabrics. That is, the 
nominal duty applies to the whole value of the product, but for AGOA producers using 
the fabrics derogation, much of the value of their output is made up of imported 
material. Moreover, not only do the synthetic products’ manufacturers gain from higher 
duties, but because in general cotton products are more complex to manufacture, the 
proportion of (generally imported) cotton fabric is in fact lower than in the case of 
imported synthetic material products. Hence, in the case of cotton products (such as 
denim), the effective rate of subsidy provided by this protective regime is 27.7 percent 
(rather than 16.6 percent), and in the case of synthetic products (such as underwear) it 
is 83.9 percent (rather than 28.2 percent) 
 
INSERT TABLE 13 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
Without the derogation from the AGOA rules of origin which allow least developed 
qualifying SSA economies to import their fabrics from outside of the region (or the US), 
little of the clothing and textile industries in the region would survive. As can be seen 
from Figure 6, excluding Mauritius and South Africa (who are unable to utilise fabrics 
imported from outside the region), almost all fabric in AGOA clothing exports has been 
imported (although the new denim mill opened in Lesotho in 2004 will reduce this 
somewhat in the future, particularly in the light of amended AGOA rules of origin – see 
below). (The lower figure for AGOA in this figure is that South African and Mauritian 
AGOA clothing exports to the US do not use imported fabrics).  
 
INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
With the exception of South Africa, SSA wage costs are proximate to many Chinese 
plants. Here, those economies whose countries were linked to the Rand (South Africa, 
Lesotho and Swaziland) experienced an increase in the dollar value of wages due to 
exchange rate appreciation after 2001. But wages are only one component of unit 
labour costs. A detailed investigation of productivity in Lesotho observed low levels of 
skill and efficiency (Salm et. al., 2002). Middle management was particularly weak, and 
was largely made up of Chinese workers with shopfloor experience, but little 
management know-how and largely unable to communicate with the Sesotho speaking 
labour force.9  
  
The Manchester Trade Team (2005) compared costs along a range of factors for 
COMESA and China and India for an equivalent product to show the non labour-cost 
barriers faced by SSA clothing exporters. They found that: 
 
• Export finance costs in Kenya (13 percent p.a.) and Madagascar (18 percent 
p.a) were much higher than in China (5.5 percent) and India (10.5 percent) 
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• Material costs were much higher in Kenya ($3/sq ft) and Madagascar ($4/sq. ft) 
than in China ($1.50/sq ft) and in India (($2.50/sq.ft) 
 
• Transport costs to the US East Coast were lower for Kenya and Madagascar 
than for China ($0.29 versus $0.33 per jean) but were lowest for India ($0.23 
per jean). 
 
• The cost of machinery and of power were rather similar, but labour productivity 
with equivalent machines was significantly higher in China (25 pieces/day) than 
in India (21 p.d.), Kenya (18 p.d) and Madagascar (16 p.d). 
 
Moreover, clothing manufactures depend heavily on access to reliable infrastructure. 
Here SSA producers are disadvantaged compared to their Asian counterparts.10 In 
some countries water supplies, critical to successful production are intermittent. One of 
the clothing firms in Lesotho had to close 13 out of 23 lines in 2004 due to water cost, 
availability and quality and another Lesotho firm also observed poor water supplies as 
a handicap to production, along with power outages. Swazi firms also reported water 
shortages and power outages. In Kenya, production is often confined to EPZs 
precisely because of the failure of infrastructure supplies in the wider economy, and 
electricity costs are more than three times those in South Africa (Ikiara and Ndirangu, 
2003). Similarly, infrastructure problems act as a severe break on competitiveness in 
Madagascar (Morris and Sedowski 2006a). The comparison with China is stark, with 
Kenyan firms facing frequent outages, losing significant production due to power 
shortages, despite having to invest in generators, and new businesses have to wait 
very long periods for connection to the grid (World Bank, 2003) 
 
The weakness of the transport system, associated with bureaucratic hold-ups also 
leads to considerable delays and makes it almost impossible for SSA producers to 
produce items for higher-margins rapid-response markets. Unlike Asian competitors, 
SSA producers have to wait around 30 days to obtain their imported inputs and a 
further 28-40 days to deliver product to final markets (Interviews with companies).  
 
Finally, those economies linked to the South African Rand faced a further 
disadvantage, both in terms of the level and volatility of this currency. Taking 2000 as 
the base year, between 2001 and 2003 the Rand-$ index rose and then fell from 100, 
to 123, to 149 and back to 107. By contrast, the Chinese remnimbi was pegged at a 
steady rate to the US$ (until mid-2005 when there was a mild revaluation of 3.5 
percent), as was the Kenyan shilling. Madagascar’s currency was highly volatile, in 
part as a result of political unrest, and this posed a major problem for exporters. For 
example, in the first half of 2004, the Malagasy franc malgache lost nearly half its value 
against the dollar and the euro; then appreciated again by roughly 20 per cent by the 
end of the year, a value which was sustained through 2005. Although this depreciation 
favoured a resurrection of exports, the volatility had a deleterious inflationary impact on 
food and energy costs (Morris and Sedowski, 2006a)  
 
(d) Future of AGOA clothing and textile exports 
 
How might SSA clothing and textile exporters fare in the future? Both the macro 
evidence on past performance and the interviews with buyers and manufactures 
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suggest two determinants of future performance. The first of these are the trade 
regime, and the second is improvements in cost competitiveness, quality and delivery. 
 
With regard to the trade regime, after substantial lobbying by the African Cotton and 
Textiles Industry Forum (ACTIF) which represents SSA clothing exporters, important 
changes were made to the rules of origin in 2006. These contain significant positive 
changes but also have potentially adverse implications for SSA’s clothing exporters, 
but possibly also positive implications for its textile industry. The access to third 
country fabric was initially supposed to have expired in September 2007. But, so 
severe was the impact of China on the AGOA exporters, that the derogation was 
extended to 2012 and the intention of halving the value of the cap on these inputs has 
been abandoned. However, a new “abundant supply position” was introduced. That is, 
if the US determines that there is abundant supply in SSA in a particular fabric product, 
then it can be excluded from third country provision. For example, when Nientzing 
(Taiwanese firm) invested in a large denim plant in Lesotho in 2004, it did so on the 
basis of the guarantee that after 2007 it would no longer be discriminated against by 
the AGOA rules of origin derogation. Hence the 2006 AGOA extension included the 
declaration that denim was in an “abundant supply position” up to 30 million square 
metres. Only once this capacity has been used in denim product exports from all of 
AGOA, can producers gain access to the third country access.   
 
Secondly, there is scope for productivity improvement and for effective industrial 
policy. Indeed there is some evidence that these improvements are beginning to occur 
- export values and volumes have held up much better than employment in Kenya, 
Lesotho and Swaziland. Moreover, as various industry analysts have pointed out, there 
is considerable scope for further improvements in efficiency (Manchester Trade Team, 
2005, Salm et. al, 2002). But to achieve this requires tailored and effective government 
support and, more importantly, comprehensive firm-level restructuring in the industry. 
Enhanced capacities of innovation management – the ability to scan the environment, 
to develop appropriate strategies, and then to implement these strategies – are key to 
a successful response.  
 
The Lesotho government has thus far been the most innovative, energetic and 
successful in applying effective industrial support amongst the SSA countries. This 
includes creating the Lesotho National Development Corporation to manage and 
facilitate the industrial estates, an Inter-ministerial Task Team to eliminate bureaucratic 
blockages, tax incentives, specialised training programmes, government lobbying 
potential buyers, actively lobbying South Africa to fight for the extension of the Duty 
Credit Certificate Scheme for exporters, and setting up a Trade and Investment 
Facilitation Centre to act as a “one stop shop” (Morris and Sedowski, 2006b). 
Madagascar, by contrast, has prioritised rural poverty and not industrial development, 
and hence has no effective industrial policy; nor has it expressed the intention to 
developing and implementing one (Morris and Sedowski, 2006a).  
 
Here, the response of two South African producers may provide some pointers to other 
SSA clothing manufacturers. A producer of underwear faced a 50 per cent increase in 
imports in the first six months of 2005, predominantly from China, with a halving of its 
exports. It reacted with a rapid-response capability to help its retailers to slim overall 
inventories and to respond flexibly to changing market tastes. This strategy currently 
goes hand in hand with attempts (driven by the domestic retailers) to synergise the 
local value chain and achieve systemic efficiency. A second option is to upgrade into 
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specialised niches. One large firm began manufacturing suit linings in the 1960s, 
moving into industrial fabrics in the early 1970s. The industrial fabric division was 
developed to also cover the parachute sector, and specialised and high-tech industrial 
products now comprise 70 percent of output, and are targeted to reach 90 percent of 
sales by 2007. Significantly, this high-tech textile producer is very capital intensive in 
nature – labor costs are only 14 percent of costs (compared to 45 percent in the 
natural fibres clothing sector). Although this transition is beyond the reach of producers 
in other least developed SSA markets, the strategy of focusing on long-term upgrading 
and diversification provides an important lesson for SSA textile and clothing producers. 
 
 
4. FROM CLOTHING AND TEXTILES TO INDUSTRY: WHAT IMPACT WILL THE 
ASIAN DRIVERS HAVE ON SSA INDUSTRIALISATION? 
 
To summarise the argument so far. In an attempt to promote growth, most SSA 
economies have moved to open their economies, with the medium- and long-term 
ambition of expanding manufacturing exports. This occurs in the context of relatively 
low levels of growth of manufacturing value added, a low and static share of 
manufacturing in GDP, and a degradation in the technological profile of exports. 
Performance with regard to manufactured exports has been poor, with the solitary 
exception of clothing exports by a limited number of economies. If South Africa is 
excluded, just over one half of all SSA manufactured exports comprise clothing, most 
of which is destined for the US under the AGOA scheme. This share has in fact risen 
from 33 percent since 1990.  
The post 2005 removal of MFA quotas on Asian producers severely dented the rapid 
growth of SSA clothing and textile exports to the US. In the first two years of non-quota 
trade, SSA’s clothing and textile exports fell by 26 per cent. In the first year of quota 
removal, employment in the clothing sector fell by 43 per cent in Swaziland and by 26 
per cent in Lesotho. Following this quota-removal shock in 2005, once those firms that 
were only there for quota advantage had departed, the rate of decline was arrested in 
2006, at least for those countries having continued access to the 3rd country fabric 
provision. Furthermore Madagascar, in particular, diverted exports from the US to the 
EU which also provides trade preferences To SSA producers (Morris and Sedowski, 
2006a). Nevertheless, a significant number of companies remained and continued to 
export. The common thread amongst these survivors is that whether they were 
oriented to the US or the EU market, they continued to operate in a preferential 
environment which offers them low tariffs and (in the case of the US) access to 3rd 
country fabrics. Competition from the Asian drivers also had harmful effects on firms 
producing for domestic markets. In January 2007 a Zambian textile mill built with 
Chinese aid in the 1970s - the largest in the country with an annual capacity of 17m 
metres of fabric and 100,000 pieces of clothing - closed down in the face of cheap 
clothing imports from China. This led to the displacement of more than 1,000 workers 
(McGreal, 2007). In South Africa, trades unions in the clothing and textile sectors were 
able to create enough political heat to force the imposition of quotas on clothing 
imports from China in 2006. The fact that these imports from the ADs have a 
generalised impact in reducing prices for consumers and thus have an important 
positive impact on consumer welfare carries less political weight than the adverse 
specific impact on an organised and vocal set of producers (both owners and workers). 
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To what extent is this experience related to the impact of the Asian Drivers on SSA’s 
clothing and textile sector? The blunt reality is that SSA clothing and textile exporters 
cannot compete with Asian producers in general, and Chinese exporters in particular. 
They are unable to cope with a level playing-field. 
 
Bearing in mind the major role played by clothing in SSA’s manufactured exports, to 
what extent are these conclusions generalisable across manufacturing sectors? Here 
we have only fragmentary evidence relating to two other consumer goods sectors, 
furniture and footwear. As we saw in Section 2 above, the second most significant 
manufactured export in SSA (excluding South Africa) is that of wood-based products, 
predominantly from West Africa. Our own preliminary research in this sector suggest 
that China and other newly dynamic Asian Driver economies are severely threatening 
the growth of competences in the value adding wood products sectors by undermining 
exports and the learning derived from exporting. For example, in 2005, Europe’s major 
importer of garden furniture ceased sourcing from SSA (South Africa and Ghana), and 
divested itself of its joint venture equity in Ghana’s major furniture exporting firm. 
Imports were switched to Vietnam and China. There is a single reason for this – SSA is 
not price competitive. In 2005, the same garden furniture product imported from South 
Africa at £60, could be obtained for £50 from Ghana, £38 from Vietnam and only £30 
from China (interviews). By contrast, China’s furniture industry has been booming. 
Between 1993 and 2002 it has moved from being the world’s eighth largest to the 
second largest exporter. In the face of this inability to compete with Asia in general and 
China in particular, SSA’s furniture manufacturers are moving backwards into their 
resource sectors, exporting raw logs, chips for the paper industry and sawn timber 
(Kaplinsky and Morris, 2006). There is also probably a significant trade in illegally-
logged hardwoods from West and Central Africa to Asia, but this is by its nature very 
difficult to evidence. Much of this SSA-sourced timber is used by Asian manufacturers 
to produce furniture which displaces SSA from global furniture markets.11  
 
And although SSA exports few shoes, Ethiopian manufacturers targeting the domestic 
market have been significantly eroded by imports sourced from China. Although these 
imports have stimulated an upgrading of processes and design by many domestic 
firms, they simultaneously had a negative impact on employment and domestic output. 
A study of 96 micro-, small and medium domestic producers reported that as a 
consequence of Chinese competition, 28 percent were forced into bankruptcy, and 32 
percent downsized activity. The average size of microenterprises fell from 7 to 4.8 
employees, and of SMEs, from 41 to 17 (Egziabher, 2006),  
 
Six wider conclusions can thus be drawn from the experience of SSA’s clothing sector 
in the face of rising global competition from the ADs. First, the indirect impacts are 
significant and often dwarf the direct bilateral impact of the ADs on low income 
economies. For example, Lesotho, Swaziland and Kenya have a limited number of 
bilateral trade links with China; yet they are very heavily affected by Chinese 
competition in third markets. Second, the damage to SSA industrialisation is not just a 
problem for the present – it also affects future growth trajectories. Industries such as 
clothing, furniture and shoes have proved to be important stepping-stones for industrial 
development in other countries, including in the AD economies themselves. If these 
sectors are significant disadvantaged by competition from the ADs, what path is to be 
followed if industrial development and economic diversification are to be pursued in the 
future? 
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Third, we have charted the impact of AD competition in SSA, and predominantly 
excluded South Africa from the analysis. To what extent are these conclusions relevant 
for South Africa, and for other regions in the world? There are compelling reasons to 
believe that the prospects facing large parts of Latin American and Caribbean industry 
are not dissimilar to those confronting SSA (Kaplinsky, 2005; Jenkins and Dusserl 
Peters, 2006).  Lall and Albaladejo showed that at least until the early years of the 
millennium, China was synergistically integrated into its local economy (Lall and 
Albaladejo, 2004; see also McDonald, Robinson and Thierfelder in this volume). China 
in reality was the assembling tip of a series of East Asian regional value chains. But 
they warned that this complementary relationship between China and its neighbours 
might not be sustained in the future as Chinese industrial capabilities grow. 
 
Fourth, our analysis challenges the pervasive commitment by the development 
community to an open-playing field in global trade, as well as the widespread belief 
that developing countries have a common interest in trade negotiations. The last thing 
SSA’s outward oriented clothing industry needs is a level-playing-field free-trade 
environment. This would spell the death not just of its outward-oriented industry, but 
almost certainly also its domestically-oriented industry. SSA needs protection, but 
more against other low-income country producers than those from high income 
countries, which generally no longer compete with African exports. 
 
Fifth, we have moved beyond a world in which “soft commodities” such as tea, coffee 
and cocoa are homogenous products with low barriers to entry, and manufactures are 
heterogeneous with high barriers to entry. In many sectors of manufacturing, especially 
of clothing, footwear and other basic consumer goods global manufacturing 
capabilities are widespread and barriers to entry are low. Yet in the same sectors there 
are segments which are innovation intensive. Similarly in many agricultural 
commodities there are also a range of innovation-intensive niches. The same is true of 
the services sector which is increasingly diverse in nature. Hence the generic 
challenge is not so much to favour the manufacturing/industrial/agricultural or service 
sectors as developing the capacity to produce rent-intensive products with rent-
intensive processes in all of these sectors (Kaplinsky, 2007). Importantly, these 
capabilities need to be sustained over time, they need to become dynamic capabilities 
(Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1992) and to be supported by policies promoting 
innovation (Lall and Teubal, 1998), innovation management (Tidd et al., 2005), 
enhanced infrastructure and other supply-sided measures (Broadman, 2007), an 
appropriate National System of Innovation (Nelson, 1993) and, where appropriate, 
regional clusters promoting collective efficiency (Schmitz, 1998; Morris and Barnes, 
2007). 
 
Finally to return to the theme which we addressed at the outset of this paper. Based on 
the successful experience of first and second tier Asian producers (of whom China and 
India are the most recent examples), it is widely believed that export-oriented 
industrialisation holds enormous potential for SSA and other low income economies. 
Based on the impact of the ADs on the global economy, our analysis challenges this 
belief, unless it is pursued in a severely restricted trade environment, an environment 
which runs counter to the drive by the WTO and other agencies to promote a freer-
trading global economy. 
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1 The Lall criteria treats oil and gas as a primary product (Lall, 2000). 
2  For example, in 2006 India’s Oil and Natural Gas Commission began exploring for oil in the 
Ivory Coast and then extended this to drilling. The Indian Ambassado9r to the Ivory Coast 
announced that India anticipated investing more than $1bn in the Ivory Coast over the 2006-
2010 period in oil, gas and other primary sectors 
http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4791381.stm , accessed 26 January 2007.  
3  This discussion on vectors and direct and indirect impacts draws on the Introduction to this 
Special Issue. 
4  Mauritius, Madagascar and South Africa are differentiated from other AGOA-stimulated SSA 
clothing industries in that they have had historical links to the EU market. Mauritius has always 
exported the majority of its clothing output to the EU. Madagascar followed its principal in the 
post MFA period by significantly switching exports to the EU. SSA producers benefit from 
significant tariff preferences – exceeding 12 per cent – over Chinese producers. However the 
rules of origin into the EU are more restrictive than for entry into the US (two-stage over one-
stage conversion). 
5  Because of the degree in churn in exported products (see below) it was not feasible to compare 
unit price performance over the 2006-2004 period. 
6  The Duty Credit Certificate Scheme subsidised clothing exporters from South African Customs 
Union member states but is regarded as being WTO non-compliant and was ended in 2005. 
However, under pressure from industry and governments of Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana and 
Namibia, the South African government belatedly, and late, agreed  to an interim extension until 
March 2007with the proviso that industry would respond with a WTO compliant scheme. 
7  The Chinese accession agreement to the WTO, allows for safeguard tariffs and quotas to be 
applied solely against Chinese textiles and clothing, even when imports exert only a slight 
adverse impact on the domestic industry. In June 2005, the EU and China reached an 
agreement that limited 10 categories of Chinese textiles exports to the EU to between 8 and 
12.5 percent growth above a specified base period for the next three years.  In December 2005, 
the US and Chinese trade representatives agreed to a three-year agreement reducing US 
imports of Chinese textile and apparel products in all or parts of 34 sensitive categories. 
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8  Unlike China which faces duties in exporting clothing into the EU (generally in excess of 12 per 
cent, but varying with the product), SSA exporters into the EU benefit from zero-tariff entry 
9  Although Salm’s study is now dated, concerns about low productivity were corroborated by 
anecdotal evidence from management interviews in Morris and Sedowski 2006b 
10  In addition to the cited texts, this section is based on our interviews with producers in Kenya, 
Lesotho, South Africa and Swaziland in late 2004 
11  This echoes the experience of Thailand, whose furniture industry suffered from Chinese 
competition in the Japanese market. Having developed this market for a new type of wood 
(historically rubber-wood had not been used for furniture), Thai producers found their market 
eroded by rubber-wood exports from China, using a combination of Thai and Indonesian rubber 
wood imports (Mitsuhashi, 2006). 
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Table 1: Average Annual Growth of GDP and sectoral value added: SSA, China 
and India, 1990-97 and 1998-2005 (%) 
 
 1990-1997 1998-2005 
 World SSA China India World SSA China India
GDP growth  2.75 1.92 10.56 5.48 2.93 3.70 8.90 6.42 
Agricultural value 
added  1.61 2.53 4.59 2.97 2.34 3.60 3.53 2.35 
Industrial value added  2.18 1.28 14.14 6.19 2.22 3.60 9.90 6.23 
Manufacturing, value 
added  - 0.96 11.22 6.63 2.54 2.52 NA 6.05 
Services value added  2.96 1.99 9.53 7.21 2.87 3.72 9.60 8.30 
 
Source: Calculated from World Development Indicators (accessed through ESDS in January 2007) 
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Table 2 Share of MVA in GDP (At Constant 1995 Prices) (%) 
 
 1995 2000 2004a 
Africab 12.1 12.3 12.1 
China 34.7 36.7 39 
India 16.3 15.7 15.0 
Developing Group excl China 19.2 20 20.4 
WORLD 19.8 20.1 19.9 
 
Source: UNIDO International Year Book 2006 
a Estimate 
b For Africa and not SSA.  
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Table 3. Average Annual Growth Rates of Merchandise exports and imports (%) 
 
 1990-1997 1998-2004 
 Exports Imports Exports Imports
World 8.1 7.7 8.8 9.0 
SSA 4.4 6.0 12.5 8.1 
China 17.1 15.8 21.4 26.5 
India 11.7 10.5 13.8 14.5 
 
Source: Calculated from UNCTAD (www.unctad.org) accessed in January 2007 
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Table 4. SSA’s exports the World (Excluding China) ($m) 
 
 1995  2000 2005 
Oil/Gas as % of Total 31% 40% 47% 
Manufactures as % of Total 20% 22% 21% 
Trade balance ($m) 
With oil/gas 4,573 27,486 46,598 
Without Oil/Gas -13,109 -4,695 -20,926 
 
Source: Calculated from COMTRADE (Accessed through http://wits.worldbank.org) on 23rd March 2007 
Data based on SSA as partner and not reporter 
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Table 5: Technological intensity of exports: SSA, China and India, 1990-2005 (% 
of total). 
 
China’s Export Structure   
 1995 2000 2005 
Primary 10 7 4 
Resource Based 11 9 8 
Low Tech 46 41 32 
Medium Tech 19 20 22 
High Tech 13 22 33 
India's Export Structure   
 1995 2000 2005 
Primary 20 15 12 
Resource Based 27 29 36 
Low Tech 38 39 30 
Medium Tech 11 12 16 
High Tech 4.6 5.5 5.4 
SSA's Export Structure 
 1995 2000 2005 
Primary 61 65 68 
Resource Based 22 19 16 
Low Tech 6 5 4 
Medium Tech 6 7 8 
High Tech 1.1 1.0 0.8 
 
Source: Calculated from COMTRADE (Accessed through http://wits.worldbank.org) on  23rd March 2007 
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Table 6: “Broad” and “narrow” manufactures ($m) and the share of clothing and 
textiles in SSA (excluding South Africa) exports (%), 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005. 
 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Value of production ($m) 
“Broad Manufactures" 5,674 6,039 6,838 12,453 
“Narrow Manufactures” (ie Broad Manufactures 
net of diamonds, precious stones, re-exports, oil 
and gas by-products and uranium) 2,179 2,668 3,435 4,641 
Apparel 721 1,090 1,660 2,331 
Textiles 198 222 168 121 
Cork/wood manufactures 189 248 267 434 
Share of Narrow manufactures (%) 
Apparel 33.1 40.9 48.3 50.2 
Textiles 9.1 8.3 4.9 2.6 
Cork/wood manufactures 8.7 9.3 7.8 9.4 
 
Source: Calculated from COMTRADE accessed via http:/wits.worldbank.org on 23rd March 2007 
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Table 7. SSA: Trade with China and India as a proportion of trade with the 
industrialised countries (% of total) 
 
As % of Trade with 
Developed Countries 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Exports 0.13 2.80 7.96 15.49 China Imports 0.39 4.22 8.48 18.06 
Exports 0.73 3.25 2.45 3.29 India Imports 0.91 3.42 4.59 7.44 
 
Source: Calculated from COMTRADE (Accessed through http://wits.worldbank.org) in January 2007 
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Table 8 SSA’s Trade Balance with China and India 1990-2005 ($m) 
 
Total Trade (Value $’000) 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Exports 62,000 1,240,000 5,341,000 19,223,000
Imports 134,000 1,770,000 3,548,000 13,291,000
Trade Balance -72,000 -529,000 1,793,000 5,932,000 China 
Trade Balance 
(Without Oil/Gas) -69,000 -724,000 
-
1,741,000 -7,261,000 
Exports 354,000 1,441,000 1,647,000 4,084,000 
Imports 310,000 1,434,000 1,920,000 5,478,000 
Trade Balance 44,000 7,000 -273,000 -1,394,000 India 
Trade Balance 
(Without Oil/Gas) 44,000 -761,000 -413,000 -751,000 
 
Source: Calculated from COMTRADE (Accessed through http://wits.worldbank.org) in January 2007 
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Table 9: Technological Intensity of SSA’s trade: Share of exports and imports 
comprising different categories of products, 2005 (%). 
 
 World (excl. China, India) China India Intra-SSA 
Primary Commodities  
Exports 67 81 38 17 
Imports 8 3 13 36 
Resource Based  
Exports 16 15 46 35 
Imports 17 9 24 27 
Low Technology  
Exports 4 1 3 13 
Imports 10 40 22 11 
Medium Technology  
Exports 9 2 11 23 
Imports 46 33 28 20 
High Technology  
Exports 1 0.1 1.1 5 
Imports 18 16 12 4 
 
Source: Calculated from COMTRADE (Accessed through http://wits.worldbank.org) in January 2007 
 
31 
 
Table 10. Global exports and share of US in exports of major SSA clothing and 
textile exporting economies 
 
 Country Year 
Exports $ 
‘000 
US 
Share 
(%) 
AGOA as Share of 
Exports to US (%) 
2000 78,000 89.6 NA 
2001 87,000 92.7 80 
2002 156,000 95.9 96.6 
2003 234,000 95.8 93.7 
2004 333,000 95.4 97.9 
Kenya 
2005 306,000 95.3 98.5 
2000 154,000 94.9 NA 
2001 237,000 94.3 60.1 
2002 350,000 97.9 98.9 
2003 429,000 97.7 94.9 
2004 496,000 97.3 98.2 
Lesotho 
2005 406,000 96.5 99.4 
2000 633,000 18.9 NA 
2001 709,000 27.4 51.8 
2002 387,000 26.1 84.4 
2003 527,000 41.5 94.8 
2004 784,000 45.5 97.2 
Madagascar 
2005 771,000 37.0 98.5 
2000 1,652,000 16.3 NA 
2001 1,561,000 16.6 16.3 
2002 1,524,000 18.3 41.8 
2003 1,629,000 17.9 50.2 
2004 1,638,000 15.0 65.2 
Mauritius 
2005 1,384,000 12.4 85.8 
2000 867,000 31.0 NA 
2001 864,000 38.3 17.4 
2002 927,000 39.1 46.9 
2003 1,027,000 41.2 48.7 
2004 756,000 44.1 66.3 
South Africa 
2005 571,000 33.8 64.8 
2000 56,000 88.4 NA 
2001 74,000 89.0 17.1 
2002 118,000 92.9 82.7 
2003 174,000 97.7 89.9 
2004 205,000 98.3 98.3 
Swaziland 
2005 171,000 99.4 99.0 
 
Source: UNSD COMTRADE database, accessed via World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) 23 
January  2007; Country and sectoral data calculated on the basis of US imports; For share of 
AGOA, for 2001, Gibbon, 2003; for 2004- 2005 values www.agoa.info accessed 19th March 
2007 
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Table 11: Change in value of clothing exports to the US, 2004, 2005 and 2006 (%) 
 
 2005/2004 2006/2005 2006/04 
Change in Unit Price 
of top 10 products  
2005/04 
 SSA China SSA China SSA China SSA China 
AGOA -16.5 56.9 -11.2 17.8 -25.9 84.8 -0.9 -46 
Kenya -2.5 77.8 -2.7 18.7 -5.1 112.9 -1.9 -45 
Lesotho -14.3 110.8 -0.9 28.5 -15.1 170.9 -3.2 -46 
Madagascar -14.4 72.2 -13.9 21.0 -26.3 108.3 -9.5 -44 
Mauritius -26.4 73.2 -28.7 17.9 -47.6 104.2 -4.6 -45 
Swaziland -9.9 93.3 -16.0 22.1 -24.3 136.1 -2.7 -52 
S Africa -43.7 63.9 -17.0 15.4 -53.3 89.1 3.0 -33 
 
Source: Calculated from http://dataweb.usitc.gov data, accessed on 19th March 2007 
a Unit prices calculated for top 10 products in 2004 for each AGOA country’s exports 
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Table 12: Employment decline in the clothing sector, 2004-2005. 
 
 2004 2005 % decline 
Kenya 34,614 31,745 9.3 
Lesotho 54,000 40,000 25.9 
S Africa 98,000 83,000 15.3 
Swaziland 28,000 16,000 42.9 
 
Source: Kenya and Swaziland - Industry and Government interviews; Lesotho- Morris and Sedowski 
2006b; South Africa – Edwards and Morris 2007 
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Table 13: Composition of value added and effective rates of subsidy in cotton 
denim jeans and synthetic women’s undergarments in two Swaziland clothing 
factories (%) (2005) 
 Denim jeans  Synthetic women’s 
undergarments 
Labour costs 45 30 
Fabric and other imported 
inputs 
40 66 
Utilities 3 1 
Distribution 2 2 
Other (agent fee, transport, 
etc )  
10 1 
Total 100 100 
Duty preference 16.6 28.2 
Effective rate of subsidy 27.7 83.9 
 
Source: Company interviews 
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Source: Calculated from COMTRADE (Accessed through http://wits.worldbank.org) on 23rd March 2007 
Data based on SSA as partner and not reporter 
 
Figure 1: Value of total global SSA clothing exports and related inputs sourced 
from ADs 
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Source: Manchester Trade Team (2005), from Textile Outlook International 
 
 
Figure 2: US Import prices for clothing and textiles, 1983-2002 ($/sq.m. 
equivalent) 
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Source: Calculated from http://dataweb.usitc.gov data, accessed on 19th  March 2007 
 
Figure 3: AGOA country share of US market in all product categories in which 
country exports were concentrated in 2004-2006 
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Source: Interviews, mid-2005 
 
Figure 4 Buyer perceptions of the relative importance of AGOA preferences, 
China safeguards and corporate social responsibility in the decision to source 
from SSA  
(1=not important; 5= very important) 
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Source: Company interviews 
 
Figure 5: The performance of SSA, China and India clothing firms on operational 
factors 
(1=very poor performance; 5=excellent performance) 
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Source: Calculated from US Department of Commerce, Office of Textile and Apparel (OTEXA) accessed 
in March 2007 
 
Figure 6: Share of foreign fabric in AGOA exports to US, 2001- 2006. 
 
 
